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GARY KLECK & MARC GERTZ*
INTRODUCTION
It is obvious to us that David Hemenway (H) had no intention of
producing a balanced, intellectually serious assessment of our esti-
mates of defensive gun use (DGU). Instead, his critique serves the
narrow political purpose of "getting the estimate down," for the sake
of advancing the gun control cause. An honest, scientifically based
critique would have given balanced consideration to flaws that tend to
make the estimate too low (e.g., people concealing DGUs because
they involved unlawful behavior, and our failure to count any DGUs
by adolescents), as well as those that contribute to making them too
high. Equally important, it would have given greatest weight to rele-
vant empirical evidence, and little or no weight to idle speculation
about possible flaws. H's approach is precisely the opposite-one-
sided and almost entirely speculative. Readers who have any doubts
about the degree to which H's paper is imbalanced might carry out a
simple exercise to assess our claim-count the number of lines H de-
votes to flaws tending to make the estimate too high and the number
devoted to flaws making the estimate too low. We submit that the
ratio is over 100-to-i, i.e., almost entirely devoted to speculations
about why the estimate is too high.
The political function of this advocacy scholarship is clear. While
high estimates of DGU frequency do not constitute an obstacle to
moderate controls over guns, they constitute the most serious obstacle
to advocacy of gun prohibition. Disarming the mass of noncriminal
prospective crime victims would, if high DGU estimates are even alm
* Professors of Criminology and Criminal Justice, School of Criminology and Criminal
Justice, Florida State Univesity, Tallahassee, Florida. The authors wish to acknowledge the
skillful editorial contributions of Sally Gertz. The authors also note that severe space limits
prevented them from presenting their entire response to Hemenway. A longer version
rebutting all of his claims is available from the senior author.
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proximately correct, result in large numbers of foregone opportuni-
ties for uses of guns that could prevent deaths, injuries, and property
loss. To acknowledge high DGU frequency would be to concede the
most significant cost of gun prohibition. H's paper is an attempt to
neutralize concerns about such costs and to provide intellectual re-
spectability for positions identified with Handgun Control Incorpo-
rated (HCl), the nation's leading gun control advocacy group.
H has close ties to HCI through two key staff members of HCI's
"educational" branch, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence
(CPHV). His closest and most frequent collaborator on gun-related
research is Douglas Weil, currently Research Director of CPHV,1 while
H has co-edited a strongly pro-control propaganda tract with Dennis
A. Henigan, legal counsel to HCI and CPHV.2
H's political intentions and strong feelings are also evident in his
overstatements and in the grandiose conclusions he draws from weak
or irrelevant evidence and fallacious reasoning. He does not get past
his title before making his first overstatement, claiming that he had
established, without benefit of any new empirical evidence, that our
estimates are too high and that they are "extreme overestimates." 3
He states in his first paragraph that "it is dear that [the Kleck and
Gertz] results cannot be accepted as valid."4 He incorrectly claims
that "all checks for external validity of the Kleck-Gertz finding confirm
that their estimate is highly exaggerated,"5 when in fact these checks
have repeatedly confirmed our estimates.
DGUs usually involve unlawful possession of a gun by the gun-
wielding victim, and sometimes other illegalities as well, 6 a point H
does not dispute. Yet, in making the extraordinary and counterintui-
tive claim that there is a social desirability bias to people reporting
their own illegal behavior,7 H insists that such a desirability bias is not
1 See, e.g., David Hemenway & Douglas S. Wel, Phasers on Stun, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 94 (1990); David Hemenway & Douglas S. Weil, Less Lethal Weapons, WASH. POST,
May 14, 1990 (Op-Ed); Douglas S, Wel & David Hemenway, Loaded Guns in the Home 267
JAMA 3033 (1992); Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, I Am the NRA, 8 VIOLENCE &
Viam's 353 (1993); Douglas S. Wel & David Hemenway, A Reply to K/eck 8 VIOLENCE &
VICms 377 (1993); Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, Violence in America: Guns, 268
JAMA 3072 (1992).
2 DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CoNSTITUTON: THE MYrH OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT (1995).
3 David Hemenway, Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOI-
Ocy 1430 (1997).
4Id.
5 Id. at 1431.
6 See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, 86J. Crai. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
150, 156, 174 (1995).
7 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1430-31.
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only plausible, but that it is likely.8 By the end, without having pro-
vided a scintilla of credible supporting evidence, H concludes that our
research was afflicted by an "enormous problem of false positives"
(persons claiming a DGU who did not have one) and "massive overes-
timation," flatly stating that "the Kleck and Gertz survey results do not
provide reasonable estimates about the total amount of self-defense
gun use in the United States."9 It is an impressive achievement to be
able to arrive at such high-powered conclusions without the inconven-
ience of gathering or even citing any new empirical evidence.
I. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF ONE-SIDED SPECULATION: AN OUNCE OF
EVIDENCE OUTWEIGHS A TON OF SPECULATION
H's critical technique is simple: one-sided, and often implausible,
speculation about flaws that might have afflicted our research, and
that might have been consequential enough to significantly affect our
conclusions. H devotes his attention almost exclusively to suspected
flaws that might have contributed to the overestimation of defensive
gun use (DGU) frequency. He either ignores well established sources
of underreporting, or briefly and superficially discusses them only for
the sake of dismissing them.10 When H speculates about sources of
response error that are plausible, he offers no rationale for why the
problems should lead to more false positives than false negatives. In-
stead he simply conjures up reasons they might lead to false positives.
As support for his one-sided speculations H even cites other people
guilty of the same dubious practice."
All research is flawed. Known flaws should be identified and
their likely impact assessed. Speculation about flaws can play a role in
the pursuit of truth by motivating researchers to gather better empiri-
cal evidence less afflicted by the flaws. Speculation by itself, however,
should not be given any weight in assessing evidence. An ounce of
evidence, even though flawed, outweighs a ton of speculation. Unfor-
tunately, in both good research and bad, there is no upper limit on
the amount of speculative criticism that can be directed at the work,
and thus this sort of critique is just as easily applied to good research
as to bad.
8 Id at 1438 (asserting that "the likelihood of social desirability response bias (self-
presentation bias) is clear").
9 Id. at 1444.
1o See, e.g., id. at 1439.
11 See id. at 1432 nn.11-12 (citing McDowall et al. and Reiss and Roth).
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II. RED HERRINGS AND THE IssuE NOT ADDRESSED
Much of H's paper is a red herring in that it implicitly misstates
the central technical question about our estimates. Much of it is de-
voted to elaborate speculations about why people might falsely claim
to have used a gun defensively, as if it were somehow in dispute that
there are some false positives. 12 He inaccurately hints that we unrea-
sonably ignored the possibility that some of our respondents (Rs) pro-
vided false positives.' 3
We assume as a matter of course that our survey is like all other
surveys in that some Rs give inaccurate responses to questions, and
that these errors include both false positives and false negatives. The
central question is not whether there are false positives, nor even how
many false positives there are, but rather what the relative balance is
between false positives and false negatives. Because H makes no effort
to assess the frequency of false negatives, 14 it is logically impossible for
him to draw meaningful conclusions about whether our estimates
were too high or low.
III. TiHm NATURE OF FALSE POsrrIvEs
It is hard to discern exactly what kinds of false positives H thinks
most often show up in all these gun use surveys. He waffles on the
issue of whether people are: (1) consciously inventing nonexistent
events; (2) consciously but honestly misrepresenting accounts of real
events that did not really involve DGU (e.g., they involved aggressive
use of a gun); or (3) unconsciously distorting real events. He seems to
have doubts himself about possibility (1) occurring very often, hasten-
ing to assure readers that false responders do not necessarily have to
lie,15 but is otherwise unwilling to commit himself to the relative fre-
quency of these types of misreports.
It is worth emphasizing how difficult it was for our Rs to falsely
report a completely nonexistent event as a DGU. Unlike the UFO
example that H insists is somehow parallel to reports of DGUs,16 a
respondent who wanted to falsely report a nonexistent DGU could not
qualify as having had such an experience merely by saying 'Yes."
Rather, respondents had to provide as many as nineteen internally
consistent responses covering the details of the alleged incident. In
12 See, e.g., id at 1430, 1438-40.
13 E.g., id at 1439 ("according to K-G .... none of the 88,800 individuals who have not
had a gun use are reporting having had one").
14 This judgment specifically includes H's section V. See id at 1435-37.
15 Id- at 1435.
16 Id. at 1437.
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short, to sustain a false DGU claim, Rs had to do a good deal of agile
mental work, and stay on the phone even longer. On the other hand,
all it took to yield a false negative was for a DGU-involved R to speak a
single inaccurate syllable: "No." The point is not that false positives
were impossible, but rather that it was far harder to provide a false
positive than a false negative.
Consider also the context in which H imagines all these false re-
ports to have occurred. Randomly selected people were called unex-
pectedly, and questioned rapidly by total strangers, for no more than
fifteen minutes, with one question immediately following another.
There was no prolonged opportunity to invent a nonexistent event,
rehearse inaccurate details, or to otherwise get an false story straight.
Rs providing a false positive had to be not only dishonest but very
quick-witted as well.
Regarding possibility (2), we noted that most of the DGUs were
linked with the types of crimes-burglaries, robberies, and sexual as-
saults-where there is little opportunity for participants to be honestly
confused about who was the victim and who was the offender.' 7 While
a few Rs may well have consciously misrepresented aggressive actions
as defensive, and a very few might have consciously invented entirely
fictitious events, it is hard to see how Rs could report an account of a
real burglary, robbery, or sexual assault in which they were aggressors
and somehow honestly distort it into a DGU incident.
This kind of misunderstanding of real events in a way that falsely
qualifies them as DGUs is more plausible in connection with male-
against-male assault incidents, such as when people prefer to charac-
terize their partly aggressive, partly defensive behavior in "mutual
combat" incidents as purely defensive in character. We addressed this
latter possibility in our article and showed that it could not account
for more than a small fraction (probably less than a tenth) of the inci-
dents we counted as DGUs. i8 H does not rebut that evidence.
IV. RAISING THE DEAD: RESUSCITATING THE NCVS ESTIMATES
OF DGU
H contrasts National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) esti-
mates of DGU with our estimates, 19 but is evasive as to why he does
this. He never explicitly says that he considers the NCVS estimates
accurate, perhaps because he knows this position is indefensible.20
17 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 174.
18 Id.
19 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1432.
20 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 153-57.
1450 [Vol. 87
GETTING THE DGU ESTIMATE DOWN
But if the NCVS estimates are not accurate, what is the point of citing
them in the context of a challenge to our very different estimates, and
asserting that the NCVS is the "gold standard" for estimating criminal
victimization?2'
On the other hand, if H really does believe the NCVS estimates
are even approximately accurate, he may well be the last scholar in
this field to cling to this belief. After touting the NCVS estimates of
DGU for years, even authors as strongly wedded to the rare-DGU posi-
tion as Philip Cook22 and David McDowall 23 have ceased portraying
the NCVS estimates as valid. Instead, they have shifted to the agnostic
views that no survey, including the NCVS, can yield meaningful esti-
mates24 or that "the frequency of firearm self-defense is an issue that is
far from settled. ' 25 Either view is incompatible with the position that
the NCVS estimates are at least approximately valid and therefore
have settled the matter. By December of 1994, Cook had taken a posi-
tion directly contradicting H's seeming acceptance of the NCVS esti-
mates, stating that there are "persuasive reasons for believing that the
[NCVS] ... yields total incident figures that are much too low.",26
We provided a detailed explanation of why the NCVS grossly un-
derestimates DGU frequency and noted that its DGU estimates had
been repeatedly disconfirmed by other surveys.27 Still, H uses the
NCVS estimates as a standard against which he judges the DGU esti-
mates of other surveys.28 He falsely claims that the NCVS asks "about
self-defense gun use," 29 when in fact, as we pointed out, the NCVS
never directly asks about DGU.30 Instead it merely provides Rs with an
opportunity to volunteer information about a DGU in response to a
general question about self-protection actions. Nor does H acknowl-
edge that the NCVS is the only survey that ever has yielded annual
DGU estimates under 700,000, and that its estimates, centering
21 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1441.
22 See PHILIP COOK & MARK C. MOORE, GUN CONTROL IN CRIME, 267-94, 566-71 (James
Q. Wilson &Joan Petersilia eds., 1994); Phillipj. Cook, The Technology of Personal Violence, in
14 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1991).
23 See David McDowall & Brian Weirsema, The Incidence of Defensive Firearm Use of U.S.
Crime Victims, 1987-1990, 84 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1982 (1994).
24 See Phillip Cook & Jens Ludwig, You Got Me: How Many Defensive Gun Uses Per Year?
(Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Am. Soc'ty of Criminology, Chicago, Ill.,
Nov. 20, 1996).
25 David McDowall, Firearms and Self-Defense, 539 ANNALS 130, 138 (1995).
26 Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence, or Pandemic of Propa-
ganda? , 62 TENN. L. REv. 513, 537 (1995) (quoting Cook).
27 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 153-57.
28 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1432.
29 1d.
30 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 155.
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around 80,000, are far below those generated by at least fifteen other
surveys.3 1 Instead, he inverts reality by falsely hinting that it is the
Kleck-Gertz estimate which is the deviant result.
V. FALlAcIous REASONING: HEMENWAY'S "CHECKS ON
EXTERNAL VALIDIT"
In our article, we cautioned against two kinds of fallacious reason-
ing. Instead of avoiding these errors, H knowingly embraces them.
The fallacious arguments involve a misapplication of reductio ad ab-
surdum argumentation, based on the misperception that estimates
from our survey are inconsistent with known crime counts and the
erroneous assumption that the NCVS provides correct estimates of the
absolute frequency of crime.
H argues that our estimates are implausible because our survey
implies a number of DGUs occurring in connection with burglaries
that exceeds the total number of burglaries of occupied residences
estimated by the NCVS.3 2 This argument rests on an unacknowledged
assumption that the universe of DGU events sampled by our survey is
a subset of the universe of crime events covered by the NCVS. How-
ever, we had explicitly warned in our paper that "a large share of the
incidents covered by our survey are probably outside the scope of inci-
dents that realistically are likely to be reported either to the NCVS or
police. '33 This is true because DGUs typically involve criminal behav-
ior, such as unlawful gun possession, by the gun-using victim, who
therefore is often unwilling to report the incident. Once it is recog-
nized that many DGU events are outside the realm of crime incidents
effectively covered by the NCVS, it is logically impossible to treat any
NCVS estimates as imposing an upper limit on how many DGUs there
plausibly could be.
H's logic is also fallacious in assuming that one can cast doubt on
conclusions based on a large body of data by deriving implausible im-
plications from smaller subsets of the data. Our estimates of total
DGUs are likely to be fairly reliable partly because they are based on a
very large sample (n=4977), while any estimates one might derive per-
taining to one specific crime type are necessarily less reliable because
they rely partly on a far smaller subsample, i.e., the 194 reported DGU
incidents, of which about 40 were linked to burglaries.3 4 H's reductio
ad absurdum logic is equivalent to arguing that Gallup presidential
31 di. at 153-59.
32 Hernenway, supra note 3, at 1441.
33 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 167.
34 Id. at 184-85.
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election polls cannot accurately estimate the share of the entire elec-
torate voting for the Democratic candidate (something we know they
can do, usually to within two percentage points)3 5 because they some-
times yield implausible estimates for small subsets of the electorate,
such as rural Hispanic Jews. Even if estimates of DGUs linked to a
given specific crime type were implausible-which they are not-this
would imply nothing about whether estimates of all DGUs, based on
the full sample, are accurate.
Finally, even if one ignored these logical fallacies, H's argument
still fails, because it depends on an erroneous factual assumption. H
states that "from the NCVS, we know that there were fewer than six
million burglaries in 1992," 36 and makes similar statements about
rapes.37 In fact, we do not "know" any such thing. No competent
criminologist believes that the NCVS provides complete coverage of
all burglaries, or any other crimes, occurring in the U.S. And once
one concedes that there may be far more crimes than the NCVS esti-
mates, H's argument collapses, since it becomes impossible to argue
that the number of DGUs linked to a given crime are implausibly high
relative to the total number of crimes of that type-we simply do not
know the latter number.
In a second variety of this fallacious line of reasoning, H cites
estimates of the number of gunshot wound (GSW) victims treated in
emergency rooms and falsely claims that "K-G report that 207,000
times per year the gun defender thought he wounded or killed the
offender. s38 In fact, we did not compute or report this 207,000 esti-
mate, and we specifically cautioned against using our data on GSWs
because they were based (unlike our estimates of DGU frequency in
general) on a small sample. Moreover, we cautioned because we had
done no detailed questioning of Rs regarding why they thought that
they had wounded their adversaries.3 9
In any case, there is nothing even mildly inconsistent between
this GSW estimate and emergency room data on persons treated for
GSWs. H again makes the implicit assumption that DGU-linked
woundings are entirely a subset of woundings treated in medical facili-
ties. If one more plausibly assumes that substantial numbers of less
serious GSWs are not treated in such facilities, the number of medi-
cally treated GSWs cannot be used as an upper limit on the number of
35 326 THE GALLuP PoLL MONTHLY 33 (Nov. 1992) (summarizing Gallup Poll presiden-
tial election accuracy record).
36 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1441.
37 Id. at 1442.
38 Id.
39 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 173.
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DGUs that result in a GSW. If, for example, the total annual number
of GSWs, treated or untreated, were 400,000, there would obviously be
nothing even mildly implausible about 200,000 of them being DGU-
linked, especially in light of the fact that the vast majority of victims of
known assault GSWs are criminals. 40
It is unlikely that a criminal wounded by a victim during the com-
mission of a crime would seek medical attention for any but the most
life-threatening GSWs, since medical personnel are required by law to
report treatment of GSWs to the police. 41 Less than a tenth of assault
GSWs are life-threatening. 42 Thus, almost all of the DGU-linked
woundings of criminals probably lie outside the universe of GSWs
treated in emergency rooms and other medical facilities. The number
of medically treated GSWs therefore cannot serve as an upper limit on
either the total number of GSWs or on the number that occur in con-
nection with a crime victim's DGU. In sum, since we do not know the
total number of crime victimizations or GSWs, we cannot possibly
know if a DGU estimate is implausibly large relative to these unknown
(and possibly unknowable) quantities.
VI. THE UFO ANALo c
Perhaps the most bizarre part of H's paper is the analogy he
draws between survey reports of DGUs and reports of contacts with
alien spacecraft. H is once again dealing in a red herring. No one
disputes that some behaviors or experiences can be greatly overesti-
mated. Rather, the relevant issue is whether DGU happens to be one
of those experiences. The extent and kinds of response errors in
surveys are heavily dependent on subject matter, so the extent of mis-
estimation with respect to one topic casts little light on the likely de-
gree of error in misestimating another topic unless the topics are very
similar.
We assume that most Rs who respond affirmatively to UFO ques-
tions are having a little fun with the interviewers, though a few un-
doubtedly are serious. On the other hand, we find it harder to believe
that Rs would regard questions about crime victimization and DGUs
in so frivolous a light. In addition, this analogy ignores the fact that
all it took to be counted as a UFO spotter was the one-syllable re-
sponse 'Yes," while it took as many as 19 logically consistent responses
providing details about the incident to be counted as a defensive gun
40 GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARms AND THEIR CONTROL, ch. 1 (forthcoming
1997).
41 Roberta K. Lee et al., Incidence Rates of Firearm Injuries in Galveston, Texas, 1979-1981,
134 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 511, 519 (1991).
42 KLECK, supra note 40, at ch. 1.
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user. The analogy H sees escapes us.
VII. THE PosrrIIE SocIL BIAS SPECULATION
H does not deny or rebut our observation that most of the re-
ported DGUs involved illegal behavior on the part of the Rs.43 He
simply ignores it, perhaps because he recognizes that it would be diffi-
cult to persuade readers that survey Rs are biased in favor of overre-
porting unlawful behavior. He insists that the predominant bias
surrounding DGU reports is a "social desirability response bias"44 with
Rs making false reports of DGUs to present themselves as "heroic. '45
H ignores the information we provided in our article on the distinctly
unheroic character of the DGU accounts provided.46 What was most
striking about the reported events was their banality. If H's specula-
tions had merit, false portrayals of heroism should have involved fre-
quent claims of facing down gun-wielding bad guys and exciting
shootouts. In fact, Rs reporting DGUs claimed to have faced adversa-
ries with guns in only one-in-six cases,47 claimed involvement in a
shootout (both parties shooting) in just 3% of the cases,48 and usually
reported opponents with no weapons at all.49 Likewise, they rarely
boasted about their deadly shooting, with only 8% even claiming to
have wounded an adversary.50
In any case, H is again focussing on a red herring. The issue is
not whether some Rs might think DGUs are heroic (this is undoubt-
edly true for at least a few people), but rather whether this sentiment
is so strong and pervasive that it would, on net, outweigh the seem-
ingly more common and natural tendency to conceal one's illegal be-
haviors from strangers who call on the phone. By addressing only the
social desirability of reporting heroic acts, H distracts readers once
again from the issue of the relative balance of response errors. He
provides no evidence or even argumentation as to why any social de-
sirability effects should outweigh simple concerns about revealing
one's unlawful behaviors.
43 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 155, 171-74.
44 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1438.
45 Id.
46 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 179-80.






VIII. MAKING SOMETHING OUT OF NOTHING: HEMENWAY'S
NuMEIcAL EXERCISES
It would be understandable if some readers thought that H did
present, in his Section V, empirical evidence on the relative balance of
false positives and false negatives. 5 1 In fact, this section presents no
empirical evidence at all. Instead, H's numerical examples demon-
strate nothing more than that if one arbitrarily assumes particular
rates of false positives and false negatives, along with extremely low
actual DGU rates, one can come up with enormous overestimates. We
cannot fault H for his arithmetic. If there were any credibility to the
misreporting rates he assumes out of thin air, they would indeed im-
ply huge overestimates.
H's argument is fallacious because it assumes the very conclusion
he wants to draw-that is, H assumes that there is a nonneglible rate
of reporting false positives. The problem is that H does not present
any empirical evidence that there were any false positives among the
cases we treated as DGUs, nor among those so treated in other gun
use surveys, never mind the large numbers he assumes.
H states that "with few actual positives, it is impossible for a screen
to pick up many false negatives," and that "it follows that, for events
with low incidence. . . the estimated incidence will tend to be greater
than the true incidence. '52 The operative phrase is "tend to be." All
one can validly conclude from Section V is that there is more potential
for false positives than false negatives, i.e., that there hypothetically
could be more false positives than false negatives. Whether there actu-
ally are more false positives that false negatives in surveys of DGU or
other crime-related experiences is an issue to which H never brings
any empirical evidence (as distinct from speculations and assump-
tions) to bear. Rather, he jumps from the fact that this potential exists
to the non sequitur conclusion that "you inevitably get a large number
of false positives relative to the number of true positives" and thus an
overestimate. 53
H's claim that our results are "extremely sensitive" to small
changes in the specificity rate is another example of argumentation
that relies on assuming the conclusion. 54 The main reason that his
example estimates in Table 2 are so sensitive to the specificity rate is
because H assumes extremely low actual DGU rates, i.e., he assumes
the very conclusion he is pushing. Thus, instead of the empirically-
51 See Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1435-37.
52 Id. at 1436.
53 Id. at 1437 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 1436.
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based 1.33% estimate we obtained, 55 H assumes an actual DGU rate of
0.32% in Table 2(A), 0.04% in 2(B) and 0.08% in 2(C).56 Because he
arbitrarily assumes there are so few true positives, even a handful of
false positives can outnumber them and substantially distort the esti-
mates. For example, in Table 2 (B), the main reason H's assumed rate
of false positives of 1.3% has such a proportionally large distorting
effect on the estimate is because he assumes, without any empirical
foundation, that the actual DGU prevalence rate is virtually zero, so
thatjust sixty-four false positives can be thirty-three times higher than
the assumed number of just two (!) true positives. 57 For what it's
worth, the estimates would be highly sensitive to the specificity rate, if
the true DGU rate were as low as H assumes, but then it is the DGU
rate that is at issue.
In our view, a more realistic version of H's Table 2-one more in
tune with research on errors in surveys of illegal behavior 5 8-might
have forty-eight true positives, forty-eight false negatives (and thus
ninety-six persons with a genuine DGU), ten false positives, and 4,894
true negatives, implying 50% test sensitivity and 99.7% test specificity.
Under this alternative set of hypothetical assumptions, the true DGU
prevalence would be 1.92%, while the measured rate would be 1.32%,
as was obtained in our survey, implying that the true DGU rate was
actually 45% higher the one we obtained. Of course, the question re-
mains, which is the more plausible set of assumptions about the distri-
bution of survey response errors-H's or ours? Unlike H, who relies
on assumed numbers59 and strained analogies to the reporting of dis-
eases,60 we prefer to rely on actual empirical evidence directly address-
ing the relative prevalence of different kinds of response error in
previous surveys of illegal behavior.
IX. PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE VALIDIY OF SURVEY EsTIATEs OF
ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
H provides a discussion of "misclassification in surveys gener-
ally '61 whose most notable feature is that it is utterly silent about
surveys concerning illegal behavior and other crime-related exper-
iences. While H discusses surveys about height, automobile owner-
ship, diseases, and other topics of negligible relevance to the topic at
55 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 184.
56 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1444-45.
57 Id at 1444.
58 See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
59 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1436-37.
60 Id at 1435-37.
61 Ia at 1434-35.
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hand, he says nothing about evidence concerning the validity of re-
sponses to questions requiring Rs to report their own illegal behavior.
Surely surveys of unlawful and crime-related behaviors are more perti-
nent to the validity of DGU survey estimates than the surveys H ad-
dresses. We will correct this conspicuous omission.
A large body of empirical evidence indicates that when asked sen-
sitive questions about illegal behavior, survey Rs, on net, underreport
their involvement, and that false negatives outnumber false positives
by a wide margin. The strongest tests of validity on such questions
concern illegal drug use. Unlike other illegal behaviors, there is a
strong external criterion that analysts can use to judge the validity of
self-reports concerning drug use, because consumption of illicit drugs
leaves physical traces that can be reliably detected using physiological
means such as urine tests and hair assays. Further, illicit drug use may
be the only illegal behavior for which validity checks can effectively
detect false positives as well as false negatives.
Research using improved chemical tests has repeatedly demon-
strated that Rs self-report less drug use in interviews and on question-
naires than is later revealed by hair or urine analysis, even when
interviewed under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality. 62 For
example, among employees of a manufacturing plant, actual drug use
prevalence as measured by hair and urine analysis, was 50% higher
than the estimate produced by self-reports. 63 Among patients at a
walk-in clinic who had positive urine tests for illicit drug use, only 28%
had reported the use in earlier interviews.64 Actual use was thus at
least 3.6 times higher (100/28=3.6) than reported use. Among a
62 See generally Z. Amsel et al., Reliability and Validity of Self-Reported Illegal Activites and
Drug Use Collected from Narcotics Addicts, 11 INT'L J. OF THE AnDIcrIONS 325 (1976); W.A.
Baumgartner et al., Hair Analysis for the Detection of Drug Use in Pretrial/Probation/ParlePopula-
tions, in Summary Report to the Nat'l. Institute of Justice 1 (1990); I.H. Cisin & H.L. Parry,
Sensitivity of Survey Techniques In Measuring Illicit Drug Use, in DEVELOPMENTAL PAPERS: AT-
TEMPTS TO IMPROSE THE MEASUREMENT OF HERION IN THE NATIONAL SURVEY (J.D. Ritten-
house ed., 1971); R. Dembo et al., Urine Testing of Detained Juveniles to Identify High-Risk
Youth, NAT'L. INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE RESEARCH (1990); R. Falck et al., The Validity of Injection
Drug Users'Self Reported Use of Opiates and Cocaine, 22J. OF DRUG IssuEs 823 (1992); Stephen
Magura et al., The Validity of Methadone Clients' Self-Reported Drug Use, 22 INT'L J. OF THE
ADDICrnONS 727 (1987); Tom Mieczkowski et al., Concordance of Three Measures of Cocaine Use
in an Arrestee Population: Hair, Urine and Self-Report, J. OF PsYcHoAcrwE DRUGS 241, 246
(1991); Tom Mieczkowski, The Accuracy of Self-Reported Drug Use: An Evaluation and Analysis
of New Data, in DRUGS AND CRIME 275 (James Q. Wilson & Michael Tonry eds., 1990); Eric
D. Wish & Bernard Cropper, Drug Testing by the Criminal Justice System in DRUGS AND CRIME
391 (James Q. Wilson & Michael Tonry eds., 1990); Eric D. Wish, Drug Use Forecasting. New
York 1984 to 1986, NAT'L. INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE (Feb. 1987).
63 COOK ET AL., supra note 22, at 403.
64 Sally E. McNagny & Ruth M. Parker, High Prevalence of Recent Cocaine Use and the Unre-
liability of Patient Self-report in an Inner-city Walk-in Clinic, 267 JAMA 1106 (1992).
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group of juvenile arrestees, hair analysis indicated 56.8% had used
cocaine, but only 7.4% self-reported it in interviews.65 Thus actual use
levels were at least 7.7 times higher than self-reports indicated. In a
group of youthful jail releasees, 67% tested positive for cocaine with
hair analysis, but only 23% self-reported cocaine use in the preceding
90 days, and only 36% reported ever using it.66
Some studies have reported counts of false positives and false
negatives. Among a group of 114 arrestees, 85 of whom later tested
positive for cocaine use on hair analysis, 61 falsely denied use in inter-
views (false negatives), while none reported use but tested negative
(false positives).67 Likewise, among 86 subjects studied by Baumgart-
ner, 16 falsely denied cocaine use by self-report, but only one reported
drug use without a hair assay confirming it.68 This again indicates that
false negatives are common and false positives close to nonexistent.
These examples could be multiplied, but to no purpose. 69 The
research record is clear enough: People are far more likely to fail to
report illegal behavior in which they have engaged than they are to
falsely report illegal behaviors in which they have not engaged. Self-
report surveys therefore underestimate illegal behavior. To use H's
epidemiological terms, while "test specificity" probably approaches
100% (i.e., extremely few false positives), "test sensitivity" is probably
less than 50% (i.e., many false negatives).
X. LIBELLING OUR INTERVIEWERS
In discussing an alleged "limitation" of our survey, H writes: "the
survey was conducted by a small firm run by Professor Gertz. The
interviewers knew both the purpose of the survey and the staked-out
position of the principal investigator regarding the expected re-
sults." 7 0 The unmistakable innuendo is that some of our interviewers
faked or altered interviews to create phony accounts of "DGUs." To
our knowledge, none of our interviewers knew anything about Kleck's
views on DGU or what results he expected. H does not claim to have
communicated with even one of the interviewers, to find out what
they knew prior to interviewing. Therefore, as far as we can tell, he
had no basis whatsoever for this outrageous charge.
65 Thomas E. Feucht et al., Drug Use AmongJuvenile Arrestees: A Comparison of Self Report,
Urinalysis and Hair Assay, 24J. OF DRUG IssuEs 99, 103, 109, 111 (1994).
66 Stephen Magura et al., Measuring Cocaine Use by Hair Analysis Among Criminally-In-
volved Youth, 25 J. OF DRUG IsSUES 683, 691 (1995).
67 Mieczkowski et al., supra note 62, at 246.
68 Bamgartner et al., supra note 62, at 1.
69 See studies cited supra note 62.
70 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1433.
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An interviewer obviously could not accidentally or innocently rec-
ord an entire false account of a DGU, with as many as 19 logically
consistent responses; a single errant mark on the answer sheet would
not generate a false positive. Furthermore, as we stated in our article,
every single interview in which a DGU was alleged was validated by a
call-back by a supervisor.7 1 An interviewer-faked incident therefore
could not have survived the quality control procedures unless a super-
visor colluded.
XI. THE SURVEY HEMENWAY CHOSE NOT TO MENTION
Our estimates recently have been strongly confirmed by yet an-
other large-sample national survey, sponsored by the National Insti-
tute of Justice (NIJ), and conducted under the auspices of the Police
Foundation. 72 We can be certain that H knew about this survey be-
cause he served on the NIJ Advisory Committee for the project and
was thanked for his comments on a draft of the grant report describ-
ing the survey's findings, including its DGU estimates.73 Kleck was the
principle consultant on the Police Foundation survey, wrote most of
the associated grant proposal and most of the questionnaire, and par-
ticipated in numerous meetings with H and Cook.
H does not mention the results of this survey, perhaps for an un-
derstandable reason: It almost exactly confirms our results. We esti-
mated 2.55 million annual DGUs, using a person-based one-year
estimate.7 4 The most comparable estimate generated by this survey
was 2.45 million, well within sampling error of our estimate.75 Many
of the other estimates were even higher.76 H himself had ample op-
portunity, as a member of the Advisory Committee, to suggest solu-
tions to problems he saw in this survey, or to suggest other steps "to
reduce the bias or to validate their findings by external measures. '7 7
In light of H's claim that "all checks for external validity of the Kleck-
Gertz finding confirm that their estimate is highly exaggerated, '78
what could possibly justify H's calculated decision to withhold the re-
sults of the Police Foundation survey, when it almost exactly con-
firmed our estimates?
We doubt that anything we can say will dissuade H from his re-
71 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 161.
72 PHILIP COOK &JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA (1997).
73 Id
74 Kleck & Gertz, supra note 6, at 184.
75 COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 72, at 62.
76 Id,
77 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1431.
78 I&
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markable theory that all surveys inevitably overestimate rare events, so
he presumably would justify his decision to not mention this survey by
asserting that all surveys are now irrelevant to the issue. Nevertheless,
since the Police Foundation project yielded estimates almost identical
to those of our earlier survey, one cannot plausibly argue that our
estimates were an artifact of flaws peculiar to our survey.
This is a point that H has effectively conceded elsewhere, 79 rais-
ing the question: What was the point of all of his unsupported specula-
tidons about flaws supposedly afflicting our survey in particular,80 if H
knew that they were not responsible for our estimates being as high as
they were? Perhaps they were presented in the hope that less rigorous
readers would assume that, methodologically speaking, where there's
smoke, there must be fire.
CONCLUSIONS
Hemenway has failed to cast even mild doubt on the accuracy of
our estimates. The claim that there are huge numbers of defensive
uses of guns each year in the United States has been repeatedly con-
firmed, and remains one of the most consistently supported assertions
in the guns-violence research area. Given H's purposes, however, it is
politically inconsequential that we can easily rebut all of his claims.
We can be confident that ideologues will cite his series of one-sided
speculations as authoritative proof that our estimates have been "dis-
credited," while pro-control academics who fancy themselves moder-
ates will conclude that although maybe H was wrong on some points,
he has nevertheless somehow "cast doubt" on the estimates or "raised
serious questions" about them. Left unmentioned wl be one simple
fact: In all of H's commentary, he does not once cite the one thing
that could legitimately cast doubt on our estimates-better empirical
evidence.
79 Philip J. Cook et al., The Gun Debates's New Mythical Number How Many Defensive Uses
Per Year, 16J. PoL' ANALYsis & MGMT. 463, 465 (1997).
80 Hemenway, supra note 3, at 1433-34.
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